The domino theory was the United States reasoning behind Entering the Vietnam War. It was part of a containment strategy to stop the spread of communism to more south-east Asian countries. This strategy was brought in place after the Korean War. The United States used the domino theory as reasoning behind their actions as they believed that if Vietnam were to fall to the communists then it would spark a chain reaction leading to several more countries of South-East Asia becoming communist and the United States did not want this to happen. “If Indochina falls, Thailand is put in almost an impossible position. The same is true with Malaya with its rubber and tin. The same is true of Indonesia. If this whole part of south-east Asia goes under communist domination or communist influence, Japan, who trades with this area in order to exist must inevitably be oriented towards the communist regime” – Richard Nixon, 1953. The United States had a grave fear that they would lose allies and trade partners if Vietnam were to become communist. There was even a said threat that even Australia and New Zealand would have pressure from the north to become communist. This gave Australia a reason to panic with the threat of communism from the north as there were failed attempts to stop the communist regime from moving south and Australia had a real problem on their hands. So when the United States called on the Australian and New Zealand forces to fight they did so at will.
Finally in 1975 South Vietnam and Cambodia fell to the communists and then the Pathet Lao takeover of Laos the following September. This marked the complete failure of the 25 years of fighting the United States had done to stop South-east Asia falling to the Communist regime. In 1995 Robert McNamara former secretary of defence said “I think we were wrong. I do not believe that Vietnam was that important to the communists. I don't believe that its loss would have lead - it didn't lead - to Communist control of Asia." McNamara now argues: "Today, it is clear to me that my memorandum pointed directly to the conclusion that, through either negotiation or direct action, we should have begun our withdrawal from South Vietnam. There was a high probability we could have done so on terms no less advantageous than those accepted nearly six years later--without any greater danger to U.S. national security and at much less human, political, and social cost to America and Vietnam." This meaning that a whole war could have been averted and many lives spared.
Finally in 1975 South Vietnam and Cambodia fell to the communists and then the Pathet Lao takeover of Laos the following September. This marked the complete failure of the 25 years of fighting the United States had done to stop South-east Asia falling to the Communist regime. In 1995 Robert McNamara former secretary of defence said “I think we were wrong. I do not believe that Vietnam was that important to the communists. I don't believe that its loss would have lead - it didn't lead - to Communist control of Asia." McNamara now argues: "Today, it is clear to me that my memorandum pointed directly to the conclusion that, through either negotiation or direct action, we should have begun our withdrawal from South Vietnam. There was a high probability we could have done so on terms no less advantageous than those accepted nearly six years later--without any greater danger to U.S. national security and at much less human, political, and social cost to America and Vietnam." This meaning that a whole war could have been averted and many lives spared.